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Note
Effectiveness of Labor Provisions within Free
Trade Agreements Between the United States and
Latin American Countries
Cayla D. Ebert
The state of human rights around the globe has become
more visible and a high priority for many due to the financial
crisis of 2008, recent and current political and military conflict,
globalization, raised awareness, and new technology and
communications.1 This has occurred through the increase in
national
and
international
watchdog
organizations,2
international laws and treaties that can trigger “transnational
cooperation between governments,”3 and the era of twenty-fourhour news and social media.4 It is at the crossroads of human

Cayla D. Ebert is a 2018 J.D. Candidate at the University of Minnesota
Law School. She graduated from Indiana University Bloomington in 2015 with
Highest Distinction and holds B.A.s in Sociology, Criminal Justice, and
Spanish. Ebert is pursuing a career in International Trade regulatory work. She
would like to thank Professor Christopher Soper who served as her advisor
during the writing process, the entire Minnesota Journal of International Law
Staff who helped edit this Note, and her family and friends who have supported
her in her writing and law school career.
1. See generally Daniel Drache & Lesley A. Jacobs, Introduction, in
LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW POLICY SPACE IN HARD
ECONOMIC TIMES [hereinafter LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 1,
1–10 (2014) (explaining that the 2008 financial crisis state action extended into
new areas and put a focus on failure of government protections); Dinah Shelton,
Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV.
273 (2002) (addressing the intersections of globalization and promotion and
violation of human rights).
2. See Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human
Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 261–79 (2004) (discussing the emergence of
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations that serves as
watchdogs to human rights).
3. Drache et al., supra note 1, at 11.
4. See generally Christoph Koettl, Twitter to the Rescue? How Social
Media is Transforming Human Rights Monitoring, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL:
HUMAN RIGHTS NOW (Feb. 20, 2013), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-
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rights and international treaties where this note will focus;
when labor rights provisions are included in trade agreements.
Due to the changing nature of international trade relations,
agreements are becoming more and more comprehensive.
Overall, in recent decades there has been a shift away from
multilateralism toward bilateralism and plurilateralism in
trade relations between states due to the failed multilateral
negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the
Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1990.5 The trend towards
bilateralism and plurilateralism is reinforced by states’ ability
to go beyond the coverage of the WTO and reach “a new level of
international policy-making,”6 and creates a “domino effect”
further undermining large scale multilateral treaty
negotiations.7 These formats allow the agreements to be more
flexible and have a much broader scope to include issues such as
investment
provisions,
intellectual
property
rights,
environmental protection, and human rights protection.8
Human rights protections within trade treaties, the focus of
this Note, generally take the form of labor rights provisions. The
United States’ policy can be generally categorized into four
stages regarding such provisions. The United States-Chile
Agreement and the United States-Colombia Agreement, used as
east/twitter-to-the-rescue-how-social-media-is-transforming-human-rightsmonitoring/ (discussing how social media is used to monitor human rights
emergencies and for evidence of human rights violations).
5. See Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels, Introduction, in
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
3, 3–5 [hereinafter BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS] (Simon
Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2015). Before 1999 it was
uncommon for the major trading powers to sign bilateral agreements, but
following the failure of the WTO negotiations, “all major trading nations
(including the East Asian nations) almost immediately launched multiple
negotiations.” Id. at 3. The steep increase in bilateral agreements “has created
a competitive process among nations, with all of the major trading powers
pushing hard to conclude these agreements so as not to lose particular markets
to their competitors.” Id. at 4. There has also been an increase in plurilateral or
semi-regional agreements, often between states within proximity to each other,
but not always. See id. But, it is important to note that bilateral PTAs are not
entirely new, as it was the predominant form of trade agreements in the 1800’s
and was ushered away by a wave of multilateralism during and after the World
Wars. See id. at 3.
6. Id. at 5.
7. David Evans, Bilateral and Plurilateral PTAs, in BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 53, 53–73 (explaining that as
more countries engage in PTAs, the cost of staying on the sidelines increases
because of the continued failure of multilateral negotiations at the WTO).
8. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 5.
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case studies in this analysis, fall into the third and fourth
generations of these types of provisions. Their structure,
effectiveness, and consequences will be discussed in detail.
The goal of this Note is to address the effectiveness of labor
rights provisions within bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
between the United States and Latin American countries.
Section I seeks to explain free trade agreements briefly, why
they have popularized and evolved over time, how human rights,
specifically labor rights, have been included, and why parties
agree to them. Section II will examine the structure of labor
provisions within FTAs more in-depth, and focus on two
agreements, the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement and
the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. While
many measurements of labor rights are used in this Note, it will
analyze the two agreements in the context of domestic
legislation and policies put into place, and the enforcement
thereof, specifically looking at freedom of association, minimum
wage, and working conditions, among other labor rights.
Through this analysis, this Note argues that FTAs including
hard labor standards are more effective than those including soft
standards, but only countries with decent current labor rights
laws will agree to such treaties, therefore undermining the
effectiveness. Section II proposes implementing labor provisions
within FTAs on a graduated scale in exchange for economic
benefits such as tariff elimination as a solution to this problem.
Due to the increasing popularity and use of FTAs to not only
achieve economic benefits, but also human rights progress, this
Note concludes the current language of such agreements is
insufficient to enact the maximum potential change and
therefore the provisions should be implemented using different
mechanisms.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
In recent decades, world trade has seen a shift away from
large multilateral trade agreements, usually negotiated and
ratified through the WTO, towards regional and bilateral FTAs,
or what some refer to as preferential trade agreements (PTAs).9
9. “Free trade agreements” (FTAs) is the most commonly used term for
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This shift has been due to various economic and political
reasons, but the most significant is the failure of the recent and
still-ongoing WTO negotiation round at Doha.10 A multilateral
agreement has yet to be achieved as the developed and
undeveloped countries are unable to reach a “collective position
on provisions regarding trade liberalization which needed to be
included in the future multi-trading system.”11 While the
majority of the disagreement involves agriculture subsidies and
tariffs, under the collective WTO system, for an agreement to
enter into force, it must be concluded and agreed to by all WTO
members; essentially, all states must agree on everything.12
Since 1999, the number of bilateral agreements has increased
rapidly and “created a competitive process among nations, with
all of the major trading powers pushing hard to conclude these
agreements so as not to lose particular markets to their
competitors.”13 In 1995, forty-two percent of exported goods were
being traded under a bilateral or regional FTA, and in 2014, this
had increased to fifty-five percent of exported goods.14
This trend suggests there is a “more effective means of
market opening than multilateral trade negotiations.”15 This
shift has made international trade rules highly complex and
hierarchical including the original WTO agreement and rules (of
which 161 countries are members), regional trade integrations
trade agreements, but not all agreements create free trade, some create
discriminatory trade, and it does not include all trade structures, such as
customs unions, which is why the term “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs)
was created. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 5.
10. Jorge Heine & Joseph F. Turcotte, Free Trade Agreements and Global
Policy Space after the Great Recession, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 65, 71–72 (“[N]egotiational stalemate is symptomatic
of the diametrically opposed beliefs on the nature of the Round between
developed and developing countries.”). The Round was launched at the WTO’s
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Qatar in November 2001 with the main focus
on the needs of developing countries. The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG.
[hereinafter WTO], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
11. Beginda Pakpahan, Deadlock in the WTO: What is next?, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art19.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
12. See id.; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) ¶ 47.
13. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 4.
14. INT’L LABOUR ORG., STUDIES ON GROWTH WITH EQUITY: ASSESSMENT
OF LABOUR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS 1 (2016),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/
publication/wcms_498944.pdf.
15. Heine & Turcotte, supra note 10, at 75.
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or customs unions (e.g. European Union), and the loose regional
and bilateral free trade agreements.16 In sum, there are over 400
agreements, which can be very extensive, reaching not only into
a state’s domestic trade policies, but also to its human rights
standards, intellectual property rights, environmental
standards, and anti-competition laws.17 Some agreements are
more narrowly focused, while others can be more comprehensive.
Examples include the Australia-Chile FTA (includes IP
provisions), Central America-Dominican Republic-United States
Free Trade Agreement (includes labor rights provisions), and the
United States Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (includes
labor and environmental protections and IP rights).18 Some
scholars argue that “FTAs are seen as a key instrument to assert
domestic interests at the bilateral level and secure mutually
beneficial results” and promote growth.19
One policy argument in favor of liberalized trade, or free
trade, for the Latin American region is that “free (or freer)
competition will inevitably foster economic development”
because it lowers consumer prices, and increases industry
efficiency and productivity.20 Both things are said to boost the
domestic economy and make domestic products more
competitive abroad, which would in turn boost domestic
employment and increase foreign investment.21 Other commonly
cited pro-liberalized trade arguments stipulate that it creates

16. Lester et al., supra note 5, at 4.
17. Id. at 4–5.
18. Australia-Chile FTA, AUS. GOV’T, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
TRADE,
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aclfta/Pages/australia-chile-fta.
aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central
America FTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov
/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-centralamerica-fta (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); United States-Colombia Trade
Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-tpa (last visited
Sept. 19, 2017).
19. Heine & Turcotte, supra note 10, at 65. See also INT’L LABOUR ORG,
supra note 14, at 13.
20. Thomas H. Hill, Introduction to Law and Economic Development in
Latin America: A Comparative Approach to Legal Reform, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV.
3, 11 (2008). See generally Eddy Lee, Trade Liberalization and Employment,
U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, (Oct. 2005), http://www.un.org/
esa/desa/papers/2005/wp5_2005.pdf (referring to agreements that reduce or
eliminate tariffs and encourage free movement of goods and services as
liberalized trade).
21. Hill, supra note 20, at 11–12.
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specialization22 and economies of scale,23 allowing countries to
have a comparative advantage in a certain good or service area,
which increases efficiency and reduces the amount of resources
used in production, and that it creates an overall higher
standard of living. Comparative advantage in the trade context
is the idea that countries will produce goods in the area in which
their economy and resources give them the largest margin of
advantage in comparison to other countries.24 Bilateral
agreements, specifically, allow for more flexibility, therefore
allowing for some of these protectionist characteristics. Two
main reasons are defensive interests where “sensitive sectors
can be carved out of the agreement” and offensive interests
where “new disciplines can be promoted in some sectors of high
interest where multilateral consensus is yet to emerge.”25
Opponents to liberalized trade, specifically through regional
or bilateral agreements, argue that it leads to trade diversion,
rather than trade creation, which in turn reduces the overall
welfare of the country.26 Trade diversion is the idea that
reduction of trade barriers between two or a few countries leads
only to exchange between the member states and disincentivizes
countries to trade with those outside of their agreements.27
Studies have shown empirical proof of trade diversion such as in
Mercosur,28 where the largest increase in intra-regional trade
during the early 1990’s was in countries that lack comparative

22. Specialization was an early idea and strategy in trade. Plato explains
trade specialization: “So the conclusion is that more things will be produced and
the work be more easily and better done, when every man is set free from all
other occupations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he is natural
fitted.” Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of the World Trading System – The
Economic and Policy Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 5, 8 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009).
23. See JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, ANDREW GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 11–17 (3d ed. 2016).
24. Id. at 11–13.
25. Olivier Cattaneo, The Political Economy of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 37 (Simon
Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2015).
26. Prof Rajagopal, Where Did the Trade Liberalization Drive Latin
American Economy: A Cross Section Analysis, 6–2, APPLIED ECONOMETRICS &
INT’L DEV. 89, 90 (2006).
27. See PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 23, at 371.
28. Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Mercosur: South America’s Fractious
Trade Bloc, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mercosur-south-americas-fractious-tradebloc (“Mercosur is an economic and political bloc comprising of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.”).
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advantage.29 Opponents argue that trade creation would have
increased countries’ comparative advantage, or the largest
increase in trade would have been seen in those countries that
have a large comparative advantage.
B. HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS WITHIN PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
Latin America (which includes Central America, South
America and sometimes the Caribbean) has extremely low
economic growth rates as compared to other regions of the world,
even developing regions.30 But, Latin American economies are
categorized by periods of growth and then major setbacks.31 A
general sentiment of today’s capitalistic world is “let the market
be free, and human rights will follow,” assuming that human
rights come second to trade and economic growth.32 Evidence of
this shows through the previous FTAs signed with developing
Latin American countries as they have only focused on economic
matters in the past.33 To combat some of this idea and the
potential negative backlash and consequences of liberalized
trade, and also spark growth, there has been an increase of
countries including additional non-trade specific provisions
within FTAs and PTAs. The agreements, as mentioned before,
now tend to include other provisions including intellectual
property rights, environmental standards, and anti-competition
laws. Parties now try to “piggy back” liberalization with human
rights ideals in trade agreements, mostly through the addition
of labor rights provisions.34 These provisions also serve a highly
political function for agreements and attempt to provide
protection for all parties.
In 1994, the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) was the first FTA to include human rights provisions,
and every United States agreement since has included some

29. Pravin Krishna, The Economics of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 11, 15 (Simon Lester, Bryan
Mercurio & Lorand Bartels eds., 2015).
30. Hill, supra note 20, at 6.
31. Id.
32. Marcilio Toscano Franca-Filho, et al., Protection of Fundamental Rights
in Latin American FTAs and MERCOSUR, 20 EURO L. J. 811, 811 (2014).
33. Id. at 815.
34. Id. at 812.
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human rights provisions.35 Technically, labor rights were added
to NAFTA through a separate, supplemental document titled the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).36
The purpose of the sub-agreement is to “improve working
conditions and living standards” in Canada, Mexico, and the
United States and to “resolve issues in a cooperative manner.”37
The Agreement creates both international (the Commission for
Labor Cooperation) and domestic institutions (National
Administrative Offices) to work together on labor issues through
Such
issues
“includ[e]
“cooperative
consultations.”38
occupational safety and health, child labor, benefits for workers,
minimum wages, industrial relations, legislation on the
formation of unions and the resolution of labor disputes.”39 The
NAALC obligates parties to: 1) ensure that its labor laws and
regulations provide for high labor standards and to continue to
strive to improve those standards; 2) promote compliance with
and effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate
government action; 3) ensure that persons with a legally
recognized interest have appropriate access to administrative,
quasi-judicial, judicial, or labor tribunals for enforcement of its
labor law and that proceedings for the enforcement of its labor
law are fair, equitable and transparent; and 4) ensure that its
labor laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings
of general application are promptly published or otherwise made
available to the public and promote public awareness of its labor
law.40
As of 2002, the United States includes such provisions in all
trade agreements, but the depth, scope, and enforceability of
them varies greatly.41 As of December 2015, there were 76 trade
agreements in place, which covered 135 economies, which
include labor provisions.42 Over eighty percent of trade
agreements entered into since 2013 include human rights
provisions.43
35. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 1, 42.
36. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A Guide, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR (Oct. 2005), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalcgd.htm.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Can.Mex.-U.S., Sept. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
41. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 45.
42. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 1.
43. Id. See also id. at 11 (“Labor provisions are defined as any standard
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Not all human rights provisions included within treaties are
similar and the subject sparks much debate.44 In particular, the
United States and its trade partners tend to focus more on
workers’ and children’s rights, whereas European agreements
tend to focus more on fundamental freedoms and rights.45 The
United States has two basic models for specific enumeration of
labor rights within their treaties; the first, what some will call
more soft standards, and the second, hard (or enforceable)
standards.46 The first, which can be seen in NAFTA, or the
NAALC, is a long list of theoretical labor principles and
standards and usually an agreement of the parties to follow their
own labor laws.47 In NAFTA, eleven labor principles were listed
but only three were made actionable through dispute resolution
and enforcement mechanisms.48 Soft standards usually refer to
the “simple mentioning of human rights practices in a treaty,
while an enforcement mechanism is not given.”49 The second
model is a result of the United States Congress’ “New Trade
Policy with America” in which labor rights provisions include
five principles, all of which are actionable.50 These principles
follow the International Labour Organization’s (ILO)
Fundamental Labour Rights and include: “1) freedom of
which addresses labor relations or minimum working terms or conditions,
mechanisms for monitoring or promoting compliance, and or a framework for
cooperation.”).
44. See Robert A. Rogowsky and Eric Chyn, U.S. Trade Law and FTAs: A
Survey of Labor Requirements, 1 J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 113, 115 (2008). “Trade
agreements and trade promotion authority hang precariously on (1) the
inclusion of labor rights in future negotiations and on (2) the question whether
workers would be better off with more or with fewer trade agreements.” Id.
45. Franca-Filho et al., supra note 32, at 814.
46. EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE
AGREEMENTS BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS 142 (2009) (citing EMILIE M. HAFNERBURTON, TRADING HUMAN RIGHTS: HOW PREFERENTIAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT REPRESSION (2005)). These models
can loosely be compared to hard and soft international law where the former
refers to actual binding legal instruments and the latter carries no legally
binding force. See generally Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Vs.
Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–16 (2009).
47. Joshua M. Kagan, Making Free Trade Fair: How the WTO Could
Incorporate Labor Rights and Why It Should, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 213–15
(2011).
48. Id.
49. Gabriele Spilker & Tobias Bo hmelt, The Impact of Preferential Trade
Agreements on Governmental Repression Revisited, 8 REV. INT’L ORGS. 343, 344
n. 1 (2013).
50. Kagan, supra note 47, at 214.
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association; 2) the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining; 3) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or
forced labor; 4) the effective abolition of child labor and a
prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and 5) the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.”51 This model creates rights that cannot be
derogated or waived and can be seen in numerous FTAs
concluded by the United States including those with Peru,
Korea, Panama, and Colombia.52 Almost all agreements require
the parties to maintain their current labor standards, and to
ensure that “laws are effectively enforced and are consistent
with certain labour standards,” but earlier agreements, or soft
standards agreements, do not necessarily require states to
increase them. 53
The United States’ labor provisions policy has changed over
the years and can be generally categorized into four different
“generations” of provisions.54 The first generation includes
commitment to the eleven labor principles as seen in NAFTA
and to follow domestic labor laws.55 The second, which is
exemplified by the United States-Jordan agreement (2000),
references the 1998 ILO Declaration and “internationally
recognized labor rights.”56 This generation also introduces a
commitment of the parties to “not waive or derogate from
domestic labour laws as a means to encourage trade” and “the
labour rights and principles referred to in the agreement are
recognized and protected by domestic law.”57 The third
generation of United States labor provisions within agreements
includes those signed between 2003 and 2006 with Australia,
Bahrain, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.58 The shift was due
to the policy change in 2002, described above, that resulted in
promotion of worker’s rights and the rights of children consistent
with the ILO labor standards.59 They do include some procedural
guarantees but there is no recourse through dispute settlement
51. Id. See also ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow Up, International Labour Conference, 86th Session, (June
18, 1998, Annex revised June 15, 2010).
52. Kagan, supra note 47.
53. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 2.
54. Id. at 42.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 43.
57. Id.
58. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 43.
59. Id.
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mechanisms.60 Finally, the fourth and most recent generation of
provisions can be found in the agreements signed after 2006,
including those with Colombia, Korea, Panama, and Peru. These
agreements recognized each fundamental principle of labor
rights laid out by the ILO, and the parties agreed to incorporate
and enforce these rights under domestic labor laws.61 This last
generation also provides for dispute resolution through
arbitration for all provisions, thereby strengthening the parties’
obligations to comply.62
Recent United States FTAs rely mostly on cross-state
reporting as their enforcement or monitoring system. This
allows individuals or non-state entities to file submissions with
their domestic state-party alleging that another state party has
violated the agreement’s labor obligations, and then that state
will decide if they will pursue the claim.63 Remedies that may
result from dispute resolution may take the form of
implementation of standards, compensation, or retaliation,
depending on the parties’ agreement.64 While implementation
mechanisms at the domestic level are crucial in the application
of these provisions, in practice, existing dispute resolution
mechanisms are rarely used.65 As of 2016, the only state-to-state
arbitration for the enforcement of labor provisions is the
arbitration happening between the United States and
Guatemala.66
C. STATES’ REASONS FOR INCLUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
These provisions have been viewed as unilateral, because
large powerful states such as the United States or the European
Union can attach labor provisions to the agreements and
developing countries have no choice but to meet certain criteria
to gain access to a beneficial market.67 In some ways though, this
increases the effectiveness of such provisions. It appears these
types of agreements are mostly concluded by a large state that
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Kagan, supra note 47, at 215.
Id. at 220.
INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 2, 5.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 15.
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has respectable labor practices and a small state that has poor
practices, but similar treaties have been concluded between
states with poor human rights records. But, why do parties
include these provisions in the first place? Each side of the
agreement has their own reasons for pursuing such treaties, and
not all are based in an altruistic goal of protecting laborers.
The first reason is self-explanatory, to increase and protect
human rights, especially in the Latin American region.68 The
region’s “income inequality levels are among the highest in the
world,” which are related to low growth, poor education, and
economic volatility, among other factors.69 Inclusion of labor
rights in particular can help prevent a “race to the bottom,” or
pressure to decrease labor standards across the board.70 A
common anti-trade argument postulates that exporting
countries will lower labor standards in order to gain a
comparative advantage over countries who respect labor
rights.71 While it is unlikely that a developed country would
lower its standards, there is a higher risk for developing
countries who are seeking foreign investment.72 Contrary to this
argument, however, countries with weak core labor standards
generally tend to have very little foreign direct investment.73
This may be due to an increase of corporate social
responsibility74 and the consequences of negative publicity
involving the treatment of workers. The inclusion of social
aspects to international agreements is a step toward combatting
these issues and increasing the overall value of life for the
region. But of course, human rights issues take the back seat in
such agreements due to the economic and political nature of
them.

68. Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 44, at 117 (“[P]olls consistently show that
Americans support trade liberalization when it leads to improved conditions for
foreign and domestic workers.”).
69. Franca-Filho, et al., supra note 32, at 816.
70. Kagan, supra note 47, at 201.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 202.
73. Id. at 203.
74. Antonio Vives, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and
Markets and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI. KENT L. REV. 199, 201
(2008) (explaining that The idea of corporate social responsibility holds that a
corporation is “responsible for the impact of its activities” and has an obligation
to carry out those activities “with respect toward those affected.”).
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The second reason hinges more on domestic policy strategy
and congressional support.75 Linking trade agreements and
trade liberalization with social rights tends to allow for more
domestic support of such an agreement, therefore catering to the
policymakers.76 For instance, in the United States, the power of
the labor unions in Congress at the time the treaties are formed
has significant effects. American labor unions tend to oppose free
trade agreements and argue they have negative effects,77
support protectionist policies and oppose provisions which could
lead to a “race to the bottom” in terms of costs, and consequently,
labor rights and workers’ welfare.78 Labor protections are then
needed to increase the cost of labor and therefore control
competition between states, theoretically protecting American
jobs. On the other hand, corporate influence in Congress has a
significant effect as well in pushing these agreements through.
FTAs provide multi-national corporations many benefits and
unique legal rights such as ISDS and the ability to use cheap
labor sources.79 Some liberal American lawmakers, Latin
American countries, and human rights groups tend to have
domestic support in favor of labor standards provisions in FTAs
because they intend to serve as an enforcement mechanism.80 As
American and other western companies move their
manufacturing facilities to Latin America, Latin workers then
have more choices of where to work, and naturally, they chose
the western companies which are obligated to enforce high labor
standards due to their home countries.81 This pushes domestic
companies to improve the treatment of their workers and results
75. “Presidents, however, do not pass trade agreements into law. Congress
does.” HAFNER- BURTON, supra note 46, at 66.
76. See generally Lisa Lechner, The Domestic Battle over the Design of NonTrade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements, REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 4–6
(2016) (stating that large differences between member states regarding civil
and political rights protection levels should trigger NGO activity).
77. AFL-CIO argues, “[i]n reality, [trade] deals have failed to promote much
in the way of jobs at all, and have certainly failed to provide quality
employment.” AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS., NAFTA AT 20,
6 (2014).
78. The AFL-CIO holds that NAFTA “allows companies to move labor
intensive components of their operations to locations with weak laws and lax
enforcement” which then interferes with worker’s “fundamental rights” and
undermine bargaining power while providing foreign and multi-national
businesses with “unique legal rights.” Id. at 4–5. See also id. at 17 (depicting a
photo of a union members’ opinion that fast track is a race to the bottom).
79. Id. at 6, 8.
80. Id. at 11
81. Id.
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in a higher bar for everyone.
If treaties cover more ground and seek to combat negative
effects of trade liberalization, more politicians are likely to be on
board—on both ends of the agreement. It allows opportunities
for policymakers to add in provisions that are important to them
and it helps garner domestic support in Latin American
countries where labor provisions are more of a necessity. But,
due to the recent political and governmental policy shifts,
particularly in the United States, this argument may be
becoming less persuasive, or irrelevant.
Other positive justifications for linking labor standards to
trade treaties include coordination of labor standards on an
international level, protecting labor rights as a subset of
international human rights, building a middle class which can
participate in and increase the market, and an increase of
economic benefits and productivity of firms that comply with
fundamental labor rights.82 Regarding the first justification,
FTAs and PTAs provide a “venue for states to coordinate their
labor standards”83 and facilitate a conversation, thereby
encouraging a race to the top, rather than the bottom. This
coordination and facilitation changes labor standards into a
public good, rather than a cost to business.84 As to the second,
poor labor practices may be more often viewed as violations of
universal human rights. Labor rights are present in numerous
international documents and treaties. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes the
right to form and join trade unions.85 The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
includes the rights to just and favorable conditions of work, fair
wages, safe and healthy working conditions, equal opportunity
for promotion and reasonable limitation of working hours and
periodic holidays with pay.86 Increased labor rights will create a
more productive workforce which will then strengthen the
middle class and increase the market for domestic benefit, and
also for foreign importers.87 Additionally, a stable middle class
“is believed to be positively correlated with social peace and

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Kagan, supra note 47, at 202–06.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 204–05.
Id.
Id. at 206.
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stability.”88 An increase in labor rights can lead to productivity
and profits in other ways as well. For instance, consumers may
be willing to pay higher prices for a good or service they know
was made in compliance with high, or international, labor
standards.89 These reasons create justifications for including
labor provisions with trade agreements. The next section will
examine the results of such agreements.
II. ANALYSIS
This Note will now turn to an examination of FTAs between
the United States and Latin American countries to analyze the
effectiveness of their labor provisions. First, it will explore which
countries enter into agreements with labor provisions and the
nature of their labor rights. This analysis will next look at the
obligations an agreement creates through the language it uses
and the standards it sets, and the enforcement mechanism the
agreement creates through potential consequences of a violation
and dispute resolution mechanisms, or lack thereof.
Furthermore, this section will compare two agreements—the
United States- Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile Agreement)
and the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
(CTPA). Through this analysis and these case studies, this
section will argue that labor provisions included in FTAs
between the United States and Latin America can improve labor
rights in Latin American countries, but do not effect significant
changes in quality of working conditions, worker’s right to
associate, and other labor standards. Agreements including hard
labor standards are more effective as they create higher levels of
accountability. While this is a positive outcome in some
instances, evidence shows only countries with already decent
labor standards will agree to them, therefore resulting in little
to no change on a wide scale basis. Additionally, even when
provisions include hard standards and the threat of dispute
resolution, these mechanisms are not put into use and
undermine the power of the provisions. This section will then
suggest the United States only enter into trade treaties with
hard labor standards and employ a gradual implementation
schedule of the trade benefits when certain levels of labor
standards are met.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 206–07.
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A. TRENDS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
The United States currently has six FTAs with eleven
countries in Latin America, including the Dominican Republic
Central America FTA which includes Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
the United States-Chile FTA, United States-Peru FTA, United
States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, United StatesPanama Trade Promotion Agreement, and NAFTA (which
includes the NAALC).90
As of 2016, seventy-two percent of all trade-related labor
provisions reference the ILO instruments, including the
Declaration of Fundamental Rights listed earlier.91 This clear
trend shows governments’ awareness of the need for economic
and social integration, but countries have taken different
approaches. The United States has focused on the effective
enforcement of labor rights through legal and policy reform
before the ratification of the agreement and also through
“cooperative activities to build[] capacity and monitoring to
assess progress.”92 Chile has implemented an “approach that
relies mostly on cooperative activities to find more innovative
and far-reaching ways to address issues with respect to labour
practices in trading partner countries.”93 In addition to these
cooperative policy mechanisms put into place by the United
States and Chile, other countries are also using “technical
cooperation” which provides technical assistance and financial
resources to the partner country, “monitoring” systems to review
the progress (usually in the form of reports), dispute settlement
mechanisms, and economic disincentives as part of an
agreement’s labor provisions.94 The goal of such provisions is to
help ignite change within the institutional framework of a
country and its labor laws and policies.
90. Sabina Dewan & Lucas Ronconi, U.S. Free Trade Agreements and
Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America 3–4 (Inter-American Dev. Bank:
Dept. of Res. & Chief Economist, Working Paper No. IDB-WP-543 2014),
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6724/U.S.%20Free%20Tr
ade%20Agreements%20and%20Enforcement%20of%20Labor%20Law%20in%2
0Latin%20America.pdf;jsessionid=ABB5D492E20B406323A4C7A6C3A50B54?
sequence=1.
91. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 2.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 72–73.
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The issue of whether this trade strategy is making a
difference still remains. In general, “estimating causal effect is
difficult due the uniqueness of each country,” but also because
data on the issue is relatively sparse and the agreements are still
relatively new.95 Many of the large international organizations
that collect labor data on a global scale only have the ability to
do it every few years, which means there is rarely data to use to
assess the results or effects of recently signed agreements. Many
states do collect their own data, but the methods and
measurements vary greatly, making it difficult to compare
transnationally. Lastly, because the agreements and data are so
new, and many other factors cannot be accounted for yet, it is
only possible to speculate the effects of an agreement, rather
than find an actual causation. There is also a self-sorting bias by
states as well;96 this issue will be discussed in further detail
later. Additionally, it also greatly depends on how labor rights
and their enforcement are being measured.
For the Latin American region as a whole, income inequality
is growing and those who are losing jobs and income due to trade
are not being adequately compensated.97 But, the employment
rate for Latin America and the Caribbean increased by five
percent from 1991 to 2014, while the world employment rate
decreased by two percent.98 It must be noted though, that the
vulnerable employment rate for Latin America and the
Caribbean was at thirty-three percent in 2014.99 But, this may
be insignificant as vulnerable workers have little access to social
protection and enforcement of labor laws.100
Despite this, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
claims that, in general, “signing an FTA with the United States
appears to improve enforcement of labor law” when looking at
the number of inspectors and inspections.101 According to the
IDB from 2000 to 2012, for the region, there has been an increase
of nine additional inspectors per one million workers and an
95. Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 90, at 8.
96. Id. at 9.
97. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 4.
98. World Development Indicators: Decent Work and Productive
Employment, THE WORLD BANK, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.4?tableNo=
2.4 (last updated, Jan. 3, 2017).
99. Id.
100. See Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Employment & Social
Protection, U.S. DEP’T LAB. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/
employment.
101. Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 90, at 14.
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increase of almost four inspections per one-thousand workers.102
The productivity of labor law enforcement has increased by
almost fifty percent.103 In contrast, the ILO data claims there
has been a twenty percent increase in labor inspectors and a
sixty percent increase in the number of inspections.104 But, since
this is a regional average estimated by the ILO, naturally some
states have seen more improvement and others have seen a
decline in inspections. The effectiveness of the provisions,
measured by the ILO, is based off the implementation
mechanisms or policies at the domestic level.105
As mentioned earlier in Section I, the United States’ labor
provisions can be loosely categorized into two groups; soft
standards and hard standards.106 The former is more similar to
international human rights treaties where domestic
governments manage their own policy commitments and are
“soft on implementation.”107 These standards tend to be difficult
to enforce, or lack enforcement regulations all together, on the
international level, and are, therefore, unlikely to change the
status of labor rights, especially in developing and oppressive
countries.108 Human rights agreements’ (and also soft standards
in labor provisions within PTAs’) “greatest strength is to
mobilize human rights advocates and supply countries with
information and motivations to internalize new norms of
appropriate behavior.”109 But, this usually requires domestic
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights
advocates to take a stand against abusive governments.110
The second category, agreements that include “hard” labor
standards, requires parties to respect their own domestic labor
laws, and sets actionable standards by creating dispute
resolution mechanisms. “These fair trade regulations protecting
human rights have cooperation benefits that are in some way
102. Id. at 9–10.
103. Id.
104. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 78.
105. Id. at 5.
106. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 46, at 142.
107. Id. at 142.
108. For example, the NAALC “commits the three countries to enforce their
own labor regulations and to promote, through domestic law, 11 fundamental
labor principles. There is no obligation to adopt stronger laws or adhere to
international labor standards.” AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONG. OF INDUS.
ORGS., supra note 77, at 11.
109. HAFNER- BURTON, supra note 46, at 144.
110. Id.
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conditional on countries’ human rights actions, and the human
rights language is embedded in an enforceable incentive
structure designed to provide the economic and political benefits
of preferential market access.”111 Another scholar put it
differently: “by linking highly attractive gains from trade to the
compliance with human rights, PTAs offer a way to withhold
economic benefits or impose economic sanctions in the case of
abuse, torture, or repression.”112 This quote accurately sums up
the incentives for countries to follow the standards set by the
PTAs and describes one of the reasons why hard standards tend
to be more effective.
Next, this analysis must examine whether the language in
the provisions makes a difference to see if the soft standard
provisions have different outcomes than the hard standards
provisions. This Note argues the hard standards do tend to effect
positive change, at least in human rights or labor rights
regulations, sometimes simply because countries would not have
otherwise adopted such policies if there was not an economic
benefit to gain as reward.113 While agreements with hard
standards do include enforcement power and there is an
incentive to enter into them, labor provisions within FTAs do not
create strong coercive power.114
According to Hafner-Burton, most of those who enter into
hard standards treaties are guilty of human rights abuses.115
But, a strong argument can be made that most countries that
agree to hard standards already have a relatively strong human
rights record, so the labor provisions are not helping areas where
the worst labor rights violations occur. Otherwise that states
“agree on hard human rights standards in PTAs only if they have
a general propensity to abide by human rights in the first
place.”116 This means that these FTAs are being implemented in
areas where they are somewhat unnecessary.

111. Id. at 146.
112. Gabriele Spilker & Tobias Bohmelt, supra note 49, at 344 (citing EMILIE
M. HAFNER-BURTON, TRADING HUMAN RIGHTS: HOW PREFERENTIAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT REPRESSION (2005)).
113. See infra Section II.B.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 345.
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B. UNITED STATES-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The United States and Chile entered into a FTA in 2004
with goals pursuant to the United States’ Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2002, which changed United States’
policy to include standards consistent with the core labor
standards of the ILO.117 Chile has had a history of having bad
standards for their workers 118 which motivated both parties to
agree to labor provisions. Additionally, the United States buys
twenty percent of Chile’s exports so Chile stood to gain a lot from
a free trade agreement.119 The agreement would effectively
eliminate tariffs on ninety percent of all goods thereby
expanding Chilean exports to the United States and improving
its international trade reputation.120 This helped to persuade
those who were against improving workers’ rights.
The Chile Agreement was the first agreement the United
States entered into where the labor provisions were explicitly
within the treaty in their own chapter, whereas previous treaties
had labor provisions as a side agreement. The agreement was an
example of a PTA effecting change and reform even before it was
ratified.121 In 1999 Chile ratified the ILO conventions of the
freedom of association and the freedom to organize and bargain
collectively.122 In 2001, the United States succeeded in
encouraging Chile to pass a new Labor Code, which “expands
protections for union members, creates a system of punishments
for unfair firings, and expands laws on freedom of association
and the right to organize.”123 Through this, Chile showed good
faith in their FTA negotiations with the United States and
quieted criticizing American policymakers. This FTA shows the
possible effects of an agreement; Chile was willing to make
significant changes to get the United States to enter an
agreement and so it could comply with the treaty’s obligations
while receiving the economic trade benefits. While the language
117. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 31, n.22.
118. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, World Report 2016: Chile: Events
of 2015, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/chile#befd9b
(discussing past abuses and violations, specifically during the military rule of
1973–1990).
119. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 46, at 149.
120. Id.
121. See generally Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 44, at 127–28 (discussing
the changes in labor standards in Chile beginning in 1995).
122. Id. at 128.
123. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 46, at 150.
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and dispute mechanism of this treaty, which will be discussed
next, suggest that the Chile Agreement is a soft standards
treaty, one could argue it has some of the effects or coercive
power of a hard standards treaty because it resulted in
improvements and compliance in exchange for economic
benefits.
When examining FTAs and their effectiveness, one must
consider the language used within the treaty itself and the
subsequent standards it creates. Chapter Eighteen of the Chile
Agreement holds that “[e]ach Party shall strive to ensure that
such labor principles and the internationally recognized labor
rights . . . are recognized and protected by its domestic law.”124
The phrase “strive to ensure” does not create a hard and
enforceable obligation. Rather, it reads more as a goal or
commitment. Chilean law now provides for the “rights of
workers to voluntarily form and join unions of their choice,
bargain collectively, and conduct strikes,” while also prohibiting
antiunion practices by requiring compensation or rehiring of
workers if terminated for unionizing.125
While the labor provisions in the Agreement included
stricter obligations than other FTAs the United States had
entered into, the enforcement or dispute resolution clauses of
these provisions only permitted arbitration as a sole mechanism
for failure to comply with the obligation to enforce its own labor
laws, rather than violating the ILO core labor standards, which
were included in the provisions.126 This agreement, along with
many others categorized into the “third generation” of American
FTAs, is highly criticized for its exclusion of dispute resolution
mechanisms for all of the provisions.127 The agreement does
provide for more cooperation, consultation, and review though,
through the Labor Cooperation Mechanism and Cooperative
Consultations.128 The Labor Cooperation Mechanism holds that
each party designate a specific office within their labor
department to “carry out the work . . . by developing and

124. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 18.1, June
6, 2003, 42 U.S.T. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.–Chile FTA].
125. U.S. Dep’t of State, Off. of Inv. Aff., Chile - 9.2-Labor Policies &
Practices, EXPORT.GOV, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Chile-Labor (last
visited Nov. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Chile - 9.2-Labor Policies & Practices].
126. See U.S.–Chile FTA, supra note 124, art. 18.2; INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
supra note 14, at 45.
127. INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 14, at 43.
128. See U.S.–Chile FTA, supra note 124, art. 18.5, 18.6, Annex 18.5.
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pursuing cooperative activities on labor matters.”129 These
activities include exchanging information regarding labor
policies and their application in the Parties’ territory, advance
better understanding of how to effectively implement the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and
its Follow Up, arrange review sessions at the request of either
Party, and develop recommendations to their respective
governments.130 The Cooperative Consultations clause provides
that a “Party may request consultations with the other Party
regarding any matter arising under” the labor provisions
through a written request.131
After addressing the treaty itself, this analysis must now
turn to an examination of the results and effects of the treaty.
While an important step toward change and improvement in the
human rights arena is creating awareness and reforming the
legal standards, it does not always effect immediate change in
the real world. The analysis of statistics here is relatively
speculative as no statistical tests or scientific analysis of data
has been carried out. However, a comparison of different
benchmarks and time points from a variety of sources are
available. According to Export.gov, a site that aims to advise
foreign investors, there are “no gaps in compliance with
international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk
to investors.”132 But statistics and general sentiment seem to
suggest otherwise; significant improvement is visible in some
areas but not in others.
Before General Pinochet’s period of military rule, Chile’s
labor and employment regime included strong firm-level unions
and “active state intervention in the determination of wages,
prices, and other aspects of the industrial relations,” while
Chilean workers “enjoyed numerous protections and social
service benefits.”133 During the Pinochet era, almost all labor
rights, among other human rights, were suspended, but in 1979
a new labor code was adopted which provided again for firmlevel unions, and temporary or subcontracted workers.134 Later,

129. Id. at Annex 18.5.
130. Id.
131. Id. art. 18.3.
132. Chile - 9.2-Labor Policies & Practices, supra note 125.
133. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. NO. 2738, LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: CHILE 1
(2003),
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/HR2738ChileLaborRights.pdf
[hereinafter LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: CHILE].
134. Id. at 1–2.
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in 1988, due to Chile’s “regular abuse of worker rights” and lack
of compliance with internationally recognized worker rights, the
United States suspended its trade benefits with the country.135
Finally, in the 1990s after Pinochet had been ousted, the Chilean
government started to restore its labor code, and bring it into
compliance with the international standards at the time.136
Trade union membership grew substantially. In 2001,
10.3% of the workforce were union members and 37,000
members were added in 2002.137 The Ministry of Labor and
Social Welfare, more specifically, the Labor Directorate, is
responsible for administering and enforcing labor and
employment laws.138 In 2003, The Chilean government had
committed to hiring 300 more inspectors nationwide.139
In 2004, the year the treaty was to take effect and a few
years after Chile’s new Labor Code was passed, approximately
ten percent of the workforce was unionized, minimum wage was
$196 a month, which “did not provide a worker and family with
a decent standard of living,” and the work week was forty-eight
hours.140 In 2008, thirteen percent of the workforce was
unionized, minimum wage was $305 per month, but still did not
provide a decent standard of living, and the work week usually
consisted of forty-five hours per week.141 In 2015, the minimum
wage was $345 per month, which was significantly above the
poverty line.142 This was the first time that this minimum wage
requirement also applied to domestic workers, as the rule was
implemented in 2011.143 The ILO database holds that the trade
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3 (recognizing revisions of the national labor code in 2001 by the
Chilean National Congress as one of the reasons that has led to the rise in union
memberships).
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id.
140. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004: CHILE
(2005), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41753.htm.
141. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2008: CHILE
(2009), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119152.htm [hereinafter
CHILE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2008].
142. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2015: CHILE
(2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253211.pdf [hereinafter
CHILE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2015].
143. Ravi Kanbur, Lucas Ronconi, & Leigh Wenoja, Labor Law Violations in
Chile, 152 INT’L LAB. REV. 431, 433 (2013).
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union density as a percentage of total paid employment was
11.6% in 2004 and 15.7% in 2012.144 From 1991 to 2016, the
employment rate increased by 7.4% (as compared to the 5%
increase within Latin America and the Caribbean overall) as
well.145 Overall, there was low compliance to minimum wage
requirements from 1990–2006, but an increase in compliance
from 2006–2009.146 Furthermore, there was a large reduction in
violations in general during 2006–2009, which could be
attributed to the increased government enforcement due to the
trade agreement.147 These statistics show improvement since
the implementation of the FTA and its labor provisions, but the
majority were made before the treaty went into effect. See Figure
1 for a summary of these statistics.

Union

2001

2004

2008

2011

2015

10%

10%

13%

NA

NA

NA

$196

$205

Minimum wage

$345

Membership
Minimum
Wage (per

applicable to

month, USD)

domestic
workers

Figure 1: Summary of Chilean Workers’ Conditions

Chilean workers are guaranteed the freedom to associate or
unionize, without prior approval, and cannot be forced to join or
withdraw from a trade union as a condition for employment.148
In 2003, strikes by public sector workers were prohibited and
thirty companies were designated at essential services, in which
strikes are prohibited as well.149 According to the new labor code,
passed in 2001, employers can hire replacement workers after
fifteen days of strikes, save a few exceptions.150 The ILO
suggested to the Chilean government to change that portion of
its labor code, but the legislature refused.151 But, the new code
144. International Labour Organization, Industrial Relations Indicators:
Trade Union Membership Statistics, http://www.ilo.org/global/docs/WCMS_
408983/lang--en/index.htm (last updated Sep. 10, 2017).
145. World Development Indicators, supra note 98.
146. Kanbur et al, supra note 143, at 435.
147. Id. at 443.
148. LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: CHILE, supra note 133, at 7.
149. Id. at 8.
150. World Development Indicators, supra note 98.
151. LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: CHILE, supra note 133, at 9.
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“significantly enhances the legal protections given to trade
unionists against unfair dismissal,” as prior to the reform,
employers regularly terminated employees for participation in
strikes.152 The code also provides for higher compensations for
those workers unfairly terminated,153 but this has not
completely fixed the issue. Additionally, a 2007 International
Trade Union Confederation Report “identified continuing
antiunion practices like barring union’s leaders’ access to
companies, replacement of striking workers, and threatening
dismissal to prevent formation of trade unions.”154 The Labor
Directorate had 720 labor inspectors as of 2015, but the report
expressed a need for more and claimed that fines did not have a
deterrent effect on labor violations for larger employers.155
Overall, improvement can be seen since the passing of the
2001 labor code and the signing of the United States-Chile FTA,
but more work is needed in terms of enforcement, conviction and
fine collection, and overall effectiveness of the legal labor and
employment obligations. It is important to note that most of the
changes came from the reformed labor code in 2001, before the
agreement was signed. This shows a country’s willingness to
prove its commitment to labor rights improvements to receive
the economic and political benefits of an FTA with the United
States, but a lack of coercive power from soft standards.
The next section will analyze the United States-Colombia
FTA which is included in the “fourth generation” of America’s
labor provision with FTAs. After examining the language and
effects of the treaty, this Note will compare the two agreements
to see if one had a significantly different outcome.
C. UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
The United States and Colombia signed the Trade
Promotion Agreement (CTPA), which included detailed hard
labor standards, in 2006, but it did not go into effect until 2012.
CTPA is considered “comprehensive” as it eliminates tariffs,
removes barriers to United States services and includes
provisions regulating customs administration, trade facilitation,
government procurement, investment, telecommunications,

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 10.
Id.
CHILE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2008, supra note 141.
CHILE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2015, supra note 142.

270

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

electronic devices commerce, intellectual property (IP) rights,
environmental and labor protections.156 Once again, both
countries had a lot to gain from such a trade deal. For the United
States, Colombia has the third largest economy in Latin
America, and eighty percent of American consumer and
industrial goods exports from Colombia would no longer be
subject to tariffs, with the rest being gradually phased out.157
For Colombia, the United States is its largest trading partner,
making up almost thirty-four percent of its total trade, making
elimination of tariffs highly beneficial.158
The parties also created a side accord titled the Colombian
Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (the Plan) in 2011 to
address labor standards and meet the laid out requirements in
the larger agreement.159 The Plan required twenty-five different
measures be taken by Colombia before the deal would be
submitted to United States Congress for approval, another
example of reform before the treaty was put into effect.160 This
was the first time that Congressional approval of a trade treaty
was contingent on achieving specific labor benchmarks.161
Similar changes were made before the signing of the Chile
Agreement to show good faith, but, distinct from the Colombian
agreement, it was not required in writing.162 CTPA was not put
into effect until May 2012 when the requirements of the Plan
had been deemed met.163
The analysis will now move to the specified standards set
out by the Agreement and the Labor Action Plan and analyze
the language used. The Plan’s requirements included a creation
of a specialized Labor Ministry, criminal code and criminal
justice reform for employers “that undermined the right to
156. FACT SHEET: Benefits of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement: More American Exports, More American Jobs, OFFICE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, [hereinafter FACT SHEET],
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/factsheets/2012/april/benefits-us-colombia-trade-promotion-agreement-more-ame.
157. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://trade.gov/fta/colombia/.
158. Colombia Free Trade Agreement, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/
e/eb/tpp/bta/fta/c26415.htm.
159. Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 90, at 7.
160. Id. See Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights, Colom.-U.S.,
Apr. 7, 2011 [hereinafter Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights].
161. Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 90, at 7–8.
162. See infra Section II.B. (discussing the changes made before an
agreement between the United States and Chile was achieved).
163. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 157.
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organize and bargain collectively,” implementation of “a regime
to prevent the use of temporary service agencies to circumvent
labor rights,” cooperation with the ILO, and broaden the scope
of its protection programs, among others.164 Chapter Seventeen
of CTPA, the Chapter dedicated to labor, reaffirms the parties’
obligation as members of the ILO and stipulates that “each Party
shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and
practices” the principles laid out in the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its FollowUp.165 These principles include: “1) freedom of association; 2)
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 3) the
elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor; 4) the
effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst
forms of child labor; and 5) the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation.”166 While “a Party shall
not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws,” there leaves a lot of
room for discretion of implementation: “[e]ach Party retains the
right to the reasonable exercise of discretion and to a bona fide
decision with regard to the allocation of resources between labor
enforcement activities among the fundamental labor rights
enumerated.”167 Additionally though, parties must guarantee
citizens access to tribunals for enforcement of states’ labor
laws.168 The Agreement’s dispute resolution chapter, Chapter
Twenty-One, provides that mechanisms may be triggered in
regard to any and all provisions within the Agreement.169 This
means that all of the included labor provisions are enforceable
through consultations, interventions of the Commission, or
arbitration. The CTPA clearly lays out the stipulations and
guidelines of an arbitral panel if one is needed.170
It is clear from a close analysis of the language of the CTPA
that it creates hard, more tangible and enforceable standards as
compared to other agreements. However, one must look to see if
this results in more significant changes and improvements in
real life. Because the agreement is so recent, it is difficult to
measure the change since its implementation, but some
164. Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights, supra note 160.
165. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Colom.-U.S., art
17, Nov. 22, 2006 [hereinafter CTPA].
166. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow Up, supra note 51.
167. CTPA, supra note 165, art. 17.3.
168. Id. art. 17.4
169. Id. art. 21.
170. See generally id.
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improvements can be seen. Colombia has since implemented
laws that strengthen workers’ protections, and employ new labor
inspectors and police investigators to enforce the laws and
counter the violence against unions.171
In 2004, the United States Department of State reported
large scale human rights violations, violence against union
members, and prevalence of anti-union discrimination,
including arbitrary detention of unionists by the government.172
Only four percent of the labor force belonged to a union and there
were very few successful prosecutions of alleged crimes against
union members.173 Additionally, “47% [sic] of workers earned
wages that were insufficient to cover the costs of the
Government’s estimated low-income family shopping basket.”174
While the actual legislation in place at the time did provide for
comprehensive protection of workers, there was a lack of
government inspectors, thereby undermining the laws.175
According to the 2008 Colombia Labor Rights Report,176 labor
law was administered by the Ministry of Social Protection
(Ministerio de la Protección Social) (MPS) which encompassed
the Ministries of Labor, Social Security and Health.177 The Vice
Minister of Labor Affairs oversaw the departments of Labor
Protection (responsible for enforcing rights of workers),
Employment Promotion (encompassing employment creation
and skill development programs), and the Labor Inspectorate
(responsible for enforcing labor and employment law).178 In
2008, the Colombian Constitution and Labor Code provided that
all employees (except police and armed forces) had a right to join
a trade union and employers were prohibited from modifying
171. FACT SHEET, supra note 156.
172. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004: COLOMBIA
(2005), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41754.htm.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-210) requires the Executive to
submit a “meaningful labor rights report” of any country it is negotiating a trade
treaty with. The President assigned his responsibilities to the Secretary of
Labor who then assigned the responsibilities to the Secretary of State, United
States Trade Representative, and the Secretary of Labor in 2002. U.S. DEP’T
LAB., COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 3 (2008) [hereinafter COLOMBIA LABOR
RIGHTS REPORT 2008], https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/ColombiaLabor
Rights.pdf.
177. Id. at 5.
178. Id. at 6.
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working conditions or terminating employment in retaliation of
union membership.179 Despite this, the United States State
Department reported only 742,000 workers, or about four
percent of the workforce, were union members in 2007.180 In
2010, the United States reported a 4.4% union membership
rate.181 Additionally, government regulations pertaining to
union formation and registration made the process extremely
slow, and many claim it was used as a way to block unionization,
but the Colombian government denies this.182 Statistics
regarding union membership since the Plan were unable to be
found, so its effect is unclear. This notion was supported by the
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations (CEACR), which also noted the
Colombian government was engaging in arbitrary rejections of
new unions and union rules and using discretion beyond the
parameters given to it by the relevant legislation.183 Workers,
except those in essential public services, had the right to strike
and employers were prohibited from hiring replacement
workers, except for essential personal, during a legal strike.184
But, the MPS had relatively broad authority to determine the
legality of strikes, which would then allow employers to hire
replacement workers and punish strike participants.185
Furthermore, the ILO CEACR held that Colombia’s labor code
strike prohibitions covers too wide a range of services that are
not considered essential.186
According to the 2011 United States Department of Labor
Report, in conjunction with the Plan, Colombia re-established a
separate Ministry of Labor and made a commitment to hire 480
new inspectors.187 As of 2016, the Colombian government has
come close to carrying out this commitment as it has hired over

179. Id. at 8.
180. Id.
181. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT
16 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/colombia_LRR.pdf [hereinafter
COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2011].
182. Id. at 10–11.
183. Committee of Experts of the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, Rep. III, Part 1A, International Labour Conference, 95th
Sess., 72–73 (2006).
184. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2008, supra note 176, at 12–13.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Committee of Experts of the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, supra note 183, at 73.
187. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2011, supra note 181.

274

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

400 new inspectors.188 Colombia’s Congress passed legislation
establishing criminal penalties for those who undermine
workers’ rights to organization and collective bargaining in June
2011.189 Even though additional prosecutors were added to focus
solely on these crimes and 278 cases have been initiated, only
five of them have gone or are currently at trial.190 Also, in
response to the CEACR’s claim, Colombia agreed to collect
Colombian doctrine and case law to create guidelines narrowing
the definition of “essential services” and to provide this
information to the judiciary, inspectors, unions, and
employers.191 Due to these improvements caused by the CTPA
and the Plan, United States estimates there are 150,000 new
union members since 2011.192 In 2015, the United States
Department of State reported that training of labor inspectors
has continued and increased, and two successful collective
bargaining agreements were reached in areas they never had
been before.193
While many labor rights laws were already in place before
the CTPA and the Plan were effected, it is widely held that they
were not enforced. One group goes as far as to hold that
Colombia is the most dangerous place to be a trade union
member.194 This group also holds that the Colombian
government has devoted resources to a public relations
campaign in order to convince the international community that
they are tackling anti-union violence.195 While a certain political
bias must be considered, this gives a glimpse of Colombian
Nationals’ attitudes towards the issue. In 2006, the United

188. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, THE COLOMBIAN LABOR ACTION PLAN: A FIVE YEAR UPDATE 4 (2016)
[hereinafter THE COLOMBIAN LABOR ACTION PLAN: A FIVE YEAR UPDATE],
https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/2016_Colombia_action_plan_report
_FINAL.pdf.
189. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2011, supra note 181, at 16.
190. THE COLOMBIAN LABOR ACTION PLAN: A FIVE YEAR UPDATE, supra note
188, at 2, 5.
191. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2011, supra note 181, at 13.
192. THE COLOMBIAN LABOR ACTION PLAN: A FIVE YEAR UPDATE, supra note
188, at 1.
193. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2015: COLOMBIA
HUMAN
RIGHTS
REPORT
2015],
(2016)
[hereinafter
COLOMBIA
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/wha/253001.htm.
194. End Anti-Trade Union Violence in Colombia, JUSTICE FOR COLOMBIA,
http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/campaigns/union-rights/.
195. Id.
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States said that there was a high rate of violence against trade
union members, and in 2008, held that it was still a persistent
problem, but there had been a decline in this violence since
2002.196 One incident, for instance, resulted in the death of the
Treasurer of the Union of Judicial Employees in 2015, among
others in recent years.197 In 2016, the United States Department
of Labor recognized the success of Colombia’s protection program
that was implemented in 2011, and that there was a decline in
the homicide rate against trade union members.198 But, there
seems to be a long way to go to completely eradicate this violence.
Colombia does not have a great record in terms of working
conditions and minimum wage either. In 2008, only 1.9 million
of the 7.4 million people in the formal workforce were receiving
the government mandated minimum wage.199 Specific violations
were cited in the cut flower industry (one of the largest
industries for Colombia) due to workers working past the 48
hour maximum and not being sufficiently compensated for their
overtime.200 The minimum wage per month was $216 in 2015, a
4.6% increase.201 Colombia’s Labor Code requires “employers to
provide equipment and workplaces that guarantee the security
and health of workers and to adopt safety and health measures
to ‘protect the life, health, and morality of workers in their
service’.”202 Workers also have the right remove themselves from
dangerous working conditions, but research reveals that many
do not due to fear of job loss or other employer retaliation.203
Overall, in 2008, the United States found a high level of
accidents and unsafe working conditions in Colombia.204
Additionally, while there has been an increase in enforcement of
punishment for international labor rights violations through
fines, there reportedly is not a system put in place to collect those
fines and it is still one of the largest undermining factors of

196. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2008, supra note 176, at 44–45.
197. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, supra note 193.
198. THE COLOMBIAN LABOR ACTION PLAN: A FIVE YEAR UPDATE, supra note
188, at 2–3 (discussing the rate decrease from 100 murders per year in 2000–
2010 to 18 per year in 2015).
199. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2008, supra note 176, at 40.
200. Id. at 42.
201. COLOMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2015, supra note 193 at 56.
202. COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2008, supra note 176, at 42.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 43.
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Colombia’s labor laws.205
Through speculation of these statistics, it appears, in its
short tenure, CTPA and the Plan has effected some positive
change, but more still must be done. Specifically, the
international community should watch for the trends in antiunion labor violence as that is one of the ILO core labor rights
Colombia agreed to. It is very important to consider the
structure and timing of the changes, as most changes occurred
in 2011 due to hard standards included in the Plan, before the
United States Congress would agree to put the treaty into effect.
This acts somewhat as self-imposed hard standards by Colombia
and proves the effectiveness of economic incentives.
D. HARD OR SOFT STANDARDS: ARE EITHER EFFECTIVE?
In comparing the Chile Agreement and the CTPA, it appears
the latter has been more effective, especially in terms of policy
changes, even in its short time. Both agreements did trigger
statutory and regulatory change before they were signed by both
parties, but the CTPA has clearer, higher, and enforceable
standards.206 PTAs do not have high coercive power, nor can they
force states into doing something, meaning they lack strong
enforcement power, which is rarely triggered anyway. PTAs may
help to induce domestic policy change and enforcement if they
include hard human rights standards “by linking highly
attractive gains from trade to the compliance with human rights,
PTAs offer a way to withhold economic benefits or impose
economic sanctions in the case of abuse, torture, or
repression.”207
There are two problems to address in increasing the
effectiveness of labor provisions within FTAs. The first is that
countries will agree to and even implement improved labor laws
to gain an economic advantage through a trade treaty, but will
not enforce these new laws. One can argue that governments
oppose human rights provisions and do not plan on
implementing them domestically. This can be seen in Chile’s
case, and somewhat in Colombia’s case, as the countries now
have the proper framework, but lack the commitment to enforce
those laws and regulations.
205. See generally COLOMBIA LABOR RIGHTS REPORT 2008, supra note 176.
206. See infra II.C.
207. Spilker & Böhmelt, supra note 49, at 344.
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The second issue is that while “hard standards” treaties
seem to be better, it is likely that only countries with already
decent labor rights records or laws will agree to such “hard
standards” agreements.208 Or, one could argue that countries
enter such agreements only if they have a general tendency to
comply with the human rights provisions. Colombia’s
Constitution, labor code, and relevant administrative agencies
already legally guaranteed relatively strong labor rights, but
was lacking an effective investigation and enforcement system.
Following this argument, this means that labor rights provisions
are not being implemented in areas that have the worst records,
or areas that could benefit the most from such an agreement.
According to a study where data was collected on PTAs from
1976 to 2009, such agreements are unlikely to affect human
rights compliance when controlling for the selection bias.209
E. PROPOSED SOLUTION: GRADUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF HARD
STANDARDS WITH ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
To overcome and reduce these identified issues with labor
provisions within PTAs between the United States and Latin
America, the United States should employ a policy in which all
treaties are negotiated with hard labor standards, but
implemented at a gradual rate. It can be somewhat of a hybrid
of the types of agreements examined in this Note—the United
States should require a minimum level of compliance to enter
into the treaty, and gradually increase the level of standards or
level of compliance allowing the governments to meet the new
standards over time. To create an incentive for gradual
implementation, a simultaneous gradual decrease and
elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers will occur. Such a
policy will address both issues because it will increase the
coercive power of treaties by increasing the ability and incentive
for states with poor labor rights records and laws to enter into
treaties with hard standards. This approach is likely to be more
effective than agreements including soft labor standards
because it allows time for a nation’s laws and practice to adjust
while creating enforcement power.

208. Id. at 345.
209. Id.
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Implementing this approach would be somewhat similar to
what the United States did with Chile and Colombia,
implementing change before signing the agreement, but would
increase the benefits and incentives on both sides. In Colombia,
the United States Department of Labor has installed a full-time
attaché in order to monitor and assist the implementation of the
standards required by the Plan and the CTPA.210 The United
States has stated that “fully and effectively addressing” the
standards of the Plan and the CTPA will require “intensive and
continued engagement over time.”211 This proves that
achievement of such hard labor standards does take time and
cannot occur quickly, further supporting the need for a gradual
implementation scheme. Instead of the United States waiting to
receive any benefits while the Latin American country meets the
agreement’s requirements, the United States could share in the
reciprocity of decreased trade barriers. This could also increase
the incentive for faster implementation of the core labor rights
and new domestic policies. A counter argument to this approach
is that it requires a large amount of resources on the part of the
United States. The United States funded an almost $10 million
project from 2012 – 2016 in conjunction with the ILO to assist
Colombia in strengthening the capacity of their Ministry of
Labor.212 One could refute this argument in that the economic
and political access and relationship gained from a PTA is worth
those resources to the United States.
Gradual implementation of treaty provisions has been used
in the implementation of international human rights treaties.
Labor provisions in PTAs are similar to human rights treaties in
that they must be integrated at the domestic level.213 An
argument can be made that they also share legal factors which
210. THE COLOMBIAN LABOR ACTION PLAN: A FIVE YEAR UPDATE, supra note
188, at 6.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See generally Veronica Bilkova et al., Report on the Implementation
International Human Rights Treaties in Domestic Law and the Role of the
Courts, EUR. COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L. (VENICE COMMISSION)
4 (2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile
=CDL-AD(2014)036-e (“Human rights treaties with a judicial system of control,
such as the three regional systems of protection (European, American and
African), have special characteristics. Indeed, not only the human rights
treaties as such need to be integrated in the domestic legal orders, but in
addition the case-law of the respective judicial bodies imposes specific
obligations concerning compliance with the judgments issued and with the
interpretation given to the conventions by the international bodies.”).
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impact the implementation of human rights provisions (either
from a human rights treaty or a PTA). These factors include: “the
conceptualisation of the relation between international and
domestic legal orders (1); the status of treaties in the domestic
legal order and their place in the hierarchy of norms (2); the
direct and indirect effect and the interpretation of conformity
clauses in the domestic constitutions (3); and the existence of
legislation enabling the reception of human rights treaties into
the domestic legal order (4).”214 In terms of realistic and
potential solutions to increase the effectiveness of the
implementation of labor provisions (and human rights
provisions), it makes the most sense to focus on the fourth
factor—domestic legislation. The first three factors are very
entrenched in the constitutional system of a country and
therefore much more difficult to change. Additionally, “states
may not invoke their own domestic law as a justification” for a
treaty violation, and must conform their domestic law to that of
their international obligations.215 All of this means
implementing labor provisions in PTAs goes hand in hand with
implementing new domestic legislation and regulations. But, it
is well-known that changes to domestic policy, in any country,
takes significant time, and even more time to successfully
implement and enforce that policy, hence the need for a
graduated implementation policy.
The general idea is that economic trade benefits such as
tariff reduction or elimination would occur in exchange for
progress made in regard to labor rights in parties’ domestic
systems. This progress could be measured simply by the passing
of new legislation, but it will likely be more effective if it also
requires implementation of new policies, regulations and
enforcement systems of those new policies. Objective measures
could also be employed, for example, requiring a specific amount
of new labor inspectors or requiring the government to grant a
certain number of new trade unions. This system could create a
required benchmark system following the ILO standards and the
obligations set forth within the agreement which uses more
readily available and easily accessible data. Following the
information and measurements mentioned earlier in this Note,
the agreement could require a certain monthly wage, working
hours per week, passage of new working conditions (safety and
health) regulations, or an increase in labor union participation,
214. Id. at 6.
215. Id. at 17.
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or a clear effort to encourage labor union participation. Such a
system would create an incentive for the other party, likely the
Latin American country, to actually bring the labor provisions
into law and enforce them, as it would then be receiving
economic benefits. While this may seem like a one sided,
powerful versus powerless situation, it would also create an
incentive for the United States to help its treaty partners to
implement such provisions as the United States stands to
benefit substantially from reduced or eliminated tariffs or other
concessions agreed upon in the PTA as they are met.
III. CONCLUSION
With a shift in the nature of international trade agreements
from large scale multilateral WTO agreements to bilateral or
Plurilateral FTAs, the nature of agreements and the obligations
they create are also shifting. It is increasingly common for States
to enter comprehensive bilateral or regional FTAs including
human rights provisions. Due to the increased attention to
human rights, specifically labor rights, in recent years, the world
has seen the frequency and the extent of violations in these
fields, by both private and public parties. Such provisions show
an awareness of these violations and the need for progress and
change, especially regarding labor rights, but the results of such
provisions do not seem to meet their maximum potential effect.
This Note has discussed the structure and language of
different types of labor provisions within FTAs, specifically
between the United States and Latin American countries (where
labor rights violations are too common). It has examined the
motivations behind labor rights provisions and the results of the
different types of provisions. The United States-Chile and
United States-Colombia FTAs were used as case studies to allow
comparison between a treaty including somewhat soft
standards, and a treaty including hard standards, respectively.
Using specific agreements allowed for an analysis of the
circumstances of labor rights before and after the agreements
were signed to be done, speculating the effectiveness of such
provisions.
In the case of Chile, the act of entering into the agreement
was effective as Chile made significant improvements to their
labor laws and inspections system in order to show their good
faith in continuing out such behavior once the treaty was signed.
This evidence supports the notion that countries are more likely
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to meet strict, albeit unofficial, benchmarks when there is an
economic reward as a result. But, what seems to be because of
poor enforcement systems and lack of strong obligations, there
has not been significant changes to labor rights in Chile since
the treaty was put into effect. After the Colombia TPA, which
included stricter language of labor standards and stronger
enforcement mechanisms, some noticeable legal changes have
been made, but the country has been less successful in
implementing and enforcing these changes in a short amount of
time. These results show once again that benchmarks can be
met, but a better implementation plan is necessary.
This Note holds that FTAs including hard labor standards
are more likely to be effective, but countries with the worst
violations are not likely to enter into them due to the high and
enforceable standards, which decreases their coercive power.
This Note suggests that the United States only enter into
agreements requiring objective measurable change through
hard standards and creating enforcement mechanisms. The
proposed solution, the requirement of gradual implementation
of labor standards coupled with gradual access to economic trade
benefits, will increase the coercive power and effectiveness of
FTAs through more attainable and realistic benchmarks and
mutual benefits to both parties. FTAs between the United States
and Latin American countries have immense potential to enact
significant change to labor rights in Latin America, but must be
implemented through more effective means.

